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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents  new microeconometric evidence  on the 
relevance of nominal contracting  for employment determination  in the 
unionized  sector.  Real wages in long term union contracts contain an 
unanticipated  component that reflects unexpected  changes in prices 
and the degree of indexation.  These unexpected wage  components 
provide  a convenient  tool for separating the causal effects of wages 
on employment from other endogenous  sources of employment  and wage 
variation. 
The empirical analysis  of employment and wage outcomes  among 
collective  agreements in the Canadian manufacturing  sector reveals 
that employment and wages are only weakly related.  When unexpected 
changes  in real wages are used as an instrumental variable  for the 
contract  wage, however,  employment  is  consistently negatively  related 
to wages.  The results imply that the institutional  structure  of wage 
determination  has important effects on the cyclical characteristics 
and persistence of employment  changes. 
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What role do nominal  wage contracts  play in the determination  of 
employment  and the characteristics  of the business  cycle?  An influential 
series  of papers  by Fisher  (1977), Phelps and Taylor (1977), and  Taylor 
(1980) suggested  that fixed wage contracts are a central  feature  of the 
link  between employment  and demand  shocks.  More recent  models  of macro 
fluctuations,  however,  have  downplayed  the role of nominal  wage rigidities. 
Real business  cycle  models  (for example, Kydland  and Prescott (1982)) 
assume  that  supply  and demand  in  the labor market  are equilibrated  at 
Walrasian  levels,  and ignore the institutional  structure  of wage 
determination.  Recent  business  cycle models in  the Keynesian  tradition,  on 
the other  hand,  have shifted attention  from nominal  wage rigidities  to real 
wage  rigidities  (e.g. Blanchard  and Summers (1986)) or nominal  price 
rigidities  (e.g. Mankiw (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)). 
The shift  in interest  away from  models of  nominal  wage rigidity  can be 
attributed  to two complementary  forces.  On the theoretical  side,  there  are 
as yet no convincing  explanations  for the existence  of nominally-fixed  wage 
contracts.  Many of the contracting  models developed  over the past decade 
predict  constant  real  wages or constant  real earnings.1 More generally, 
the existence  of long-term  attachments  in the labor  market  calls into 
question  the assumption  that  employment  is allocated  on the basis  of 
2  .  current wage rates.  The notion  that long-term contracts  introduce  some 
flexibility  into the relation  between  employment  and wages lies behind  the 
concise  summary  of the implications  of these models  is presented 
by Fischer  (1987,  pp. 42-50). 
point  was made  by Barro  (1977) in a comment  on Fisher's (1977) 
paper.  A similar  argument  is pursued  by Hall (1980). 2 
recent  literature  on efficient  wage  bargaining  (McDonald  and Solow  (1981), 
Brown and  Ashenfelter  (1986), MaCurdy and Pencavel  (1986)). 
On the empirical  side,  the evidence  in  support of nominal  contracting 
models is also weak.  The simplest  of these models assume  that  aggregate 
demand  shocks  generate  real wage  changes that  lead  to movements  along  a 
downward-sloping  employment  demand  schedule.  The weak aggregate 
correlation  between  employment  and real wages  (Geary and Kennan (1982)) 
poses  a serious  threat  to this chain  of  argument.  Even  with micro-level 
contract  data,  it  has not been easy  to establish  a systematic  negative 
correlation  between  employment  and real wages.  In  fact,  the absence of 
such correlations  was s major  impetus to research  on more sophisticated 
implicit  and/or  efficient  contracting  models.3 
This paper presents  new  microeconometric  evidence  on the relevance  of 
nominal  contracting  models  to employment  determination  in  the unionized 
sector  of Canadian  manufacturing.  Using s large sample  of fixed  wage and 
escalated  contracts,  I find  strong  support for the implications  of a naive 
contracting  model: unexpected  changes in  prices  over the course  of a 
contract  lead  to unanticipated  real  wage changes  that  in turn  generate 
systematic  employment  responses.  Furthermore,  real  wage losses  or gains  in 
one contract  spill  over  to subsequent  ones.  Thus, unanticipated  price 
changes  generate  persistent  real  wage changes and persistent  employment 
responses  in  the union  sector. 
In  fact,  unanticipated  real  wage  changes play  a central  role in  the 
empirical  analysis.  A difficulty  that arises  in any study  of employment 
3See  for example  the papers  by  Hall and  Lilien (1979) and  McDonald and 
Solow (1981). 3 
and  wages is the fact  that  the two variables are Jointly  determined  in the 
labor market.4  With  micro-level  data  the problem  is particularly  severe: 
many components  of employment  variation  that appear  as random  to an outside 
observer  are perfectly  predictable  to the parties  involved.  To the extent 
that  these  components  also influence  wage determination,  they impart  a 
simultaneity  bias to the partial  correlation of employment  and wages. 
Unanticipated  real  wage changes  that occur during  the term  of fixed-wage  or 
partially  indexed  contracts  provide  a potential  solution  to this 
simultaneity  problem.  By construction,  these changes  are correlated  with 
wages  but uncorrelated  with omitted variables  that  effect  the expected 
component  of real wages.  They therefore  form  an ideal  instrumental 
variable for a structural  analysis  of  employment  demand. 
The empirical  analysis  confirms  the usefulness  of this approach. 
Controlling  for industry  demand  conditions, employment  is only  weakly 
correlated  with the level  of contract  wages.  When unexpected  teal wage 
changes  are used as an instrumental  variable  for contract  wages, however, 
employment  is systematically  negatively  related to  wages.  These  findings 
are consistent  with a  very simple  structural  model,  in which  nominal  wages 
are set in anticipation  of future  demand  conditions,  and employment  is 
determined  ex-post  on the demand  curve  for labor.  While the theoretical 
underpinnings  of such  a naive model are currently lacking,  the evidence 
suggests  that they  are a worthwhile  topic of further  research. 
4Kennan  (1988)  presents  an illuminating  analysis  of the difficulties 
that  arise in  the interpretation  of aggregate employment  and  wage data when 
these  data  are generated  by even  simple  models of demand  and supply. 4 
I.  Emolovment  and  Wases in  a Sirnole Model of Lona  Term  Contracts 
a.  Interpreting  the Correlation  of  Employment  and  Wases 
This section  presents  a simple  model of long term  contracting  in which 
nominal  wages  are pre-determined,  and employment  is set unilaterally  by the 
firm  after  aggregate  prices  and firm-specific  demand  shocks  are observed. 
Even in this simple model,  the interpretation  of  the partial correlation  of 
employment  and real  wages  is clouded by the fact that  the contracting 
parties  may  have better  information on future  demand  shocks than is 
available  to an outside  data analyst.  To develop  this point  more formally, 
suppose  that  wages are negotiated  in some  base period  (period 0) for a 
contract  of duration  T.  Let n(t) and w(t) denote  the logarithms  of 
employment  and real  wages  in period  t of  the contract,  respectively,  and 
assume  that  hours  per worker  are fixed.  The notion  of  "nominal 
contracting"  is captured  by the assumption  that the bargaining  parties  do 
not set w(t) directly:  rather,  they establish  a series of nominal  wage 
increases  from the start  of the contract,  possibly  in conjunction  with an 
indexation  formula.5  Let w*(t)  represent  the parties'  expectation  of  w(t), 
conditional  on their information  in  the negotiating  period,  and let u(t) 
represent  the forecast  error w(t) - w*(t).  The distribution  of u(t) will 
obviously  depend  on the length  of the  contract,  and on whether or not  it 
contains  a cost-of-living  escalation clause.6 
5The  nature  of typical  indexation  formulas  in North  American  labor 
contracts  is described  in Card (1983).  The only  case in which the real 
wage is set directly  by the parties  is the case of a contract  in which 
nominal  wages are indexed  to the consumer price  level with a formula that 
increases  the wage  by one percent  for each  percent  increase  in  prices. 
Such  formulas  are extremely  rare,  particularly  in the  manufacturing  sector 
of the U.S.  and  Canada. 
6This  point  is made  by Hendricks  and Kahn (1987). 5 
Assume  that  n(t)  is determined  from  an employment  demand schedule  of the 
form 
(1)  n(t)  —  a  z(t)  +  $ w(t)  +  e(t), 
where  z(t)  is a vector  of observable  variables shifting  the demand  for 
labor, $ represents  the elasticity  of labor demand  ($  < 0), and e(t)  is an 
unobservable  component  of employment  variation.  The precise  specification 
of z(t) and the corresponding  interpretation  of $ are  discussed  in  the next 
section.  Note that  supply  considerations  are explicitly  ignored:  there  are 
assumed  to be enough  available  workers  to fill the firm's  demand, 
irrespective  of  wages.  Implicitly  then, the contractual  wage is assumed  to 
be high enough  to ensure  a perfectly  elastic supply  of workers. 
This simple  model is completed  by a specification  of the determinants 
of  w*(t).  Assume  that the expected  real  wage rate in period  t is 
determined  at the negotiation  date  by  variables  known  at that time, say 
x(0),  and by the parties'  expectations  of z(t) and e(t),  Z*(t)  and e*(t), 
respectively: 
(2)  w*(t)  —  a  z*(t)  +  b x(O)  +  c e*(t). 
The realized  real  wage rate in the th  period of the contract  is therefore 
w(t)  —  a  z*(t)  +  b x(O)  +  c e*(t)  +  u(t). 
The extent  of simultaneity  bias in  ordinary least  squares  (OLS) estimates 
of the employment  determination  equation  (1)  depends  on the extent  to which 
the parties  anticipate  components  of labor demand  that  are unobservable  to 
an outside  observer  or econometrician,  and on the extent  to which these 
anticipated  components  affect  the negotiated  wage rate.  On one hand,  if 
e*(t) — 0  for all negotiations  and all  t,  then  the parties  have  no 
informational  advantage  and there  is no simultaneity  problem.  On the other hand,  if  c —  0,  so  that  expected  real wages  are unaffected  by higher  or 
lower expected  levels of employment, then  again  there  is no simultaneity 
problem.  If the parties  are better  able to forecast  employment  than  an 
outside observer,  however,  and if  higher forecasted  employment  leads to an 
increase  in negotiated  wage rates,  then real  wage rates will be positively 
correlated  with the econometric  error e(t)  in  the employment  equation,  and 
estimates  of the partial  correlation between  wages and employment  will be 
positively  biased. 
Irrespective  of the parties'  wage setting  behavior,  the elasticity  fi 
may be  consistently  estimated  by considering  the correlation  between 
unanticivated  wage rates  and employment outcomes.  The forecast  error  u(t) 
forms  an  ideal  instrumental  variable for  w(t):  by definition,  it is 
correlated  with the realization  of  wages and uncorrelated  with information 
svailsble  to the psrties  at the time of their negotiations.  Additional 
instrumental  variables  may also  be available if there are determinants  of 
negotiated  wages  which  may be legitimately excluded  from  the employment 
determination  equation  (the variables  denoted  as x(O)  in  the wage 
determination  equation  above).  Assuming  that the forecast  error  u(t)  is 
always  an appropriate  instrument,  it is possible  to test  the exclusion 
restrictions  implicit  in  the use of  other candidate  instrumental  variables 
by conventional  over-identification  tests. 
Even  in the frsmework  of this simple model,  however,  there  are two 
circumstances  in  which the correlation between  unexpected  real wage changes 
and employment  levels  may not provide useful  information  on the elasticity 
of labor  demand.  The first  is the case in which  the forecast  error  in real 
wages  is correlated  with unobservable  determinants  of labor  demand.  This 7 
may arise,  for example,  if  aggregate  price increases  signal  increases  in 
demand  thet  lead directly  to increases  in employment.  A  simple  way to 
control  for this  possibility  is to include consumer  price  increases 
directly  in  the employment  equation,  and  to use variation  across  contracts 
in  the degree  of wage indexation  to separately  identify  the effects  of 
unanticipated  wage changes and aggregate price  changes. 
A second,  potentially  more  serious  difficulty may arise  if employment 
adjustment  is  costly,  and if unexpected  changes in real  wages during  the 
term  of a contract  are immediately  offset in  subsequent  negotiations.  In 
this case,  one would not expect to  observe significant  employment  responses 
to unexpected  real wage changes  occurring at the end of a contract,  since 
these changes  are inherently  short-lived.  In  the empirical  analysis 
reported  below,  I examine  this  question  and find that the negotiated  wage 
rates  in  the subsequent  contract  are positively  correlated  with the level 
of real  wages at the end of  the previous contract.  Thus, unexpected 
changes  in real  wages  generate  persistent  effects  on the cost of 
contractual  labor, and should  be expected to generate  significant 
employment  effects  if the demand  elasticity  is nonzero. 
1.  Specification  of  the Employment  Demand Function 
This  section  discusses  the specification  of the employment  demand 
function  (1) introduced  above.  An important limitation  of the contract- 
based data  set used in the empirical  analysis is the absence  of firm- 
specific price  or output  data.  Selling prices,  intermediate  input prices, 
and output  indexes are available  at the three-digit  industry  level.  Under 
certain  conditions,  these  industry-level  data  may be used  as proxies  for B 
the underlying  firm-specific  variables.  To derive an interpretation  of the 
resulting  empiricsl  specification,  suppose that  output  is produced  from 
three  factors:  labor,  capital,  and intermediate  inputs  (raw materials  and 
energy).  Ignoring  firm-specific  constants,  assume  that  the logarithm  of 
employment  in a given  firm  in a particular  industry  in period  t,  n(t),  ia 
related  to the logarithm  of  firm-specific  output,  y(t),  the logarithm  of 
firm-specific  wages,  w(t),  the logarithm of  firm-specific  non-labor  input 
prices,  v(t),  the user cost  of  capital in period  t, r(t),  (assumed to be 
constant  across  firms and industries),  and an  error  term  q(t): 
(3)  n(t) — 
$1w(t)  + 
fl2v(t) 
- 
(fl1+fl2)r(t) + ay(t) + 1(t). 
This equation  can be interpreted  as  either a log-linear  approximation  to an 
arbitrary  employment  demand  equation, or alternatively  as an  exact 
employment  demand  function  arising  from an underlying  Cobb-Douglas 
production  function.  The restriction that  the elasticities  of employment 
demand with respect  to the three factor prices  sum to zero is a consequence 
of the homogeneity  of  the cost function.  This restriction  implies  that  the 
equation  is invariant  to  the deflator used to index wages  and other  factor 
prices.  The magnitude  of  the coefficient a reflects  the extent  of returns 
to scale:  the assumption  of constant returns  to scale,  for exsmple,  implies 
a—l. 
Let  (t) represent  the logarithm  of industry  level  output  in period t, 
and let  (t) and  (t) represent  weighted  averages  of  wages  and 
intermediate  input prices  in  the industry.  Ignoring  constants,  assume  thst 
the fin's relative  share  of  overall industry  output can be written  as 
(4)  y(t) - j'(t) 
—  1('ti(t) 
-  i(t))  + 
2(v(t) 
-  v(t))  + e(t). 9 
This equation  can be derived  by assuming  that  firms with identical  Cobb- 
Douglas  production  functions  act as  price takers  with respect  to  firm- 
specific  selling  prices.7  Alternatively,  equation  (4) can be interpreted 
as an approximation  to the output  share  equation arising  from  a simple 
differentiated  product  oligopoly  model.  In either  case,  the error 
component  e(t) represents  a combination  of firm-specific  relative  demand 
shocks  and firm-specific  productivity  shocks. 
The combination  of  equations  (3)  and (4)  leads to an expression  for 
firm-specific  employment  in  terms  of  firm-specific  wages,  industry  level 
output  and intermediate  input  prices,  the cost of  capital,  end industry 
wages: 








+  (fl2+c72)(v(t)-(t)) 
÷ aE(t) + i(t). 
Under the assumption  that increases  in the  marginal  cost of production  at 
the ith firm lead  to  decreases  in its relative share  of industry output, 
the coefficients  l 
and  are negative.  Thus,  the elasticity  of 
employment  with respect  to firm-specific  wages, holding  constant  industry 
output,  is larger in absolute  value than  the elasticity  holding  constant 
firm-specific  output.  In  fact, under the assumption  of price  taking 
7Specifically,  the bb-Douglas assumptions  implies that the output 






-y3r(t)  -(-y1+-y2+3)q(t) 
÷ 9(t), 
where q(t)  is the selling  price  for the output of  the firm  and 9(t) 
represents  a total  factor  productivity  shock.  Define  industry  output  as a 
geometric  weighted  average of the outputs of the individual  firms  in the 
industry.  Then aggregate  output  follows a similar equation,  and equation 
(4)  can  be derived  directly,  with 
€(t) — 8(t)-9(t)  -  (1+-y2+y3)(q(t)-q(t). 10 
behavior,  the implied elasticity  is  an estimate  of  the unconditional 
elasticity  of employment  with respect to  wages,  allowing  for the effect  of 
changes in  wages on  the output  supply decision  of the firm.  On the other 
hand,  the predicted  elasticity  of  employment  with  respect  to industry  wages 
is  positive.  This  reflects  the assumption  that  as wages increase  in the 
industry  as a whole, holding  constant firm-specific  wages, the firm's  share 
of industry  output  will  rise. 
Oespite  the fact  that industry-level  output  and intermediate  input 
prices  are imperfect measures  of the  corresponding  firm-specific  data, 
equation  (5) suggests  that the estimated  coefficients  of these variables 
are unbiased  estimates  of  the underlying  elasticities  of employment  with 
respect  to output  and intermediate  input prices.  The reasoning  behind this 
result  is that  the measurement  errors  that arise  from  using  industry-level 
data  in place of  firm-specific  data  are uncorrelated  with the levels  of the 
industry  variables.  For example,  deviations of firm-specific  output  from 
industry-level  output  depend  on firm-specific  demand  and cost shocks. 
These shocks  are in  principle  uncorrelated  with the industry-average  level 
of output.  Thus,  the implied regression  coefficient  of firm-specific 
output  on industry-level  output  in  equation  (4)  is  unity.  It follows 
directly  that the regression  coefficient  of  firm-specific  employment  on 
industry  output  in equation  (5)  is the output  elasticity  a. 
The specification  of equation  (5)  leads to a direct interpretation  of 
the error  component  in employment  demand e(t) introduced  in  the previous 
section.  According  to (5), the stochastic  component  of employment  demand 
consists  of 3 terms: one term reflecting  the deviation  of firm-specific 
from  industry-average  intermediate  input prices;  one term  reflecting  the 11 
combination  of relative  demand  shocks  and relative  productivity  shocks  in 
the output  share  equation  (4); and a third term  reflecting  firm-specific 
employment  productivity  shocks.  (The second and third  terms  therefore 
share  firm-specific  productivity  shocks).  It  seems  quite likely that  a 
significant  fraction  of this econometric  error  is predictable  to the 
parties involved  in the contract.  The potential  for simultaneity  bias in 
the estimated  elasticity  of employment  demand  is therefore  accentuated  by 
the lack  of firm-specific  output  and price data. 
c.  Allowing  for the Presence  of  Efficient  Contracting 
The specification  of equation  (3) reflects the assumption  that intra- 
contract  employment  levels  are determined by the firm,  taking  the wage rate 
as given.  Except  under  very special circumstances,  however,  unilateral 
employment  determination  by the firm  does not generate  an optimal 
allocation  of employment  between  contractual and extra-contractual 
opportunities.8  For this  reason,  the empirical relevance  of simple  nominal 
contracting  models  has been  sharply  questioned  (see Sarro (1977) for 
example).  The optimal  determination  of  contractual  employment  is formally 
addressed  in the implicit  contracting  literature  (see the survey  by Rosen 
(1985)) and,  under  somewhat  different  guise, in the more recent  efficient 
contracting  literature.9  The basic  point of both literatures  is that  a 
jointly  optimal employment  contract  (i.e.  one that  maximizes  profit  subject 
8As noted  by Hall and Lilien  (1979), these circumstances  are 
essentially  that  the wage rate equals  the marginal  product  on extra- 
contrsctual  opportunities. 
9See  McDonald  and Solow  (1981) for a theoretical  statement  and Brown 
and  Ashenfelter  (1986)  for a concise  summary of the empirical  implications 
of simple  efficient  contracting  models. 12 
to a utility  constraint  for workers) will determine  employment  on  the basis 
of a shadow  wage that  differs  from the contractual  wage.  The very simplest 
contractual  modal  with homogeneous  workers and  unrestricted  transfer 
payments  between  employed  and unemployed  workers  implies  that the 
appropriate  shadow  wage is simply  the marginal  productivity  of  workers  in 
their  best alternative  job.  Brown and Ashenfelter  (1986) refer  to this as 
the "strong  form" efficient  contracting hypothesisJ° 
In view  of the ad hoc nature  of  simple  contracting  models  with 
unilateral  employment  determination,  it is important  to verify that  the 
assumptions  underlying  such  a model are valid.  Any test  against  the 
alternative  hypothesis  of  efficient  contracting,  however,  requires  a 
specification  of the appropriate  shadow wage for the allocation  of 
employment.  A  simple  hypothesis  is that the shadow  wage is a weighted 
average  of  the observed  contract  wage and some  measured  alternative  wage. 
This hypothesis  can be motivated  formally by assuming  that employees' 
preferences  are represented  by a Cobb-Douglas utility function  defined  over 
employment  and the difference  between  the contractual  wage and the 
alternative  waga)1  Alternatively,  it can be viewed  as a convenient 
statistical  framework  for nesting  the alternatives  of the unilateral 
employment  determination  model imbedded in equation  (3) and the strong  form 
efficient  contracting  model.  It is important  to keep in  mind,  however, 
that this simple  procedure  cannot  provide a definitive  test  of efficient 
versus "inefficient"  contracting,  since some specifications  of an efficient 
10Sae Abowd (1987)  for an attempt to test this hypothesis  using stock 
market  data on negotiating  firms. 
See  Brown  and Ashenfaltar  (1986,  page  S54). 13 
contracting  model imply that the shadow  wage is simply  a constant  fraction 
of the contract  wage,'2  and in any case  the appropriate  definition  of the 
alternative  wage is open to interpretation.  Nevertheless,  it can  provide 
useful  evidence  for or against  a specification  such  as (3),  when the 
alternative  is an empirically  testable version of the efficient  contracting 
hypothesis. 
II. Data  DescriDtion  and Measurement  Framework 
The empirical  analysis  of employment and wages  in  this paper  is based 
on  a sample  of 1293 contracts  negotiated by 280 firm  and union  bargaining 
pairs  in  the Canadian  manufacturing  sector.13  The available  information 
for each  contract  includes  its starting (or effective)  date,  its ending (or 
expiration)  date, and the base  wage rate in each  month of  the contract.14 
Unfortunately,  the number  of employees  covered by the agreement  is only 
available  at renegotiation  dates.  I associate this level  of employment 
with  the expiring  agreement.  Thus,  each sample point  consists  of an end- 
of-contract  employment  observation  and  a series  of wages, including  the 
beginning-of-contract  and end-of-contract  wage rates.  To this set of 
12See MaCurdy and Pencavel  (1986, page Sl3). 
13chistofides  and Oswald's  (1987) analysis is based on  a sample 
derived  from  the same  source.  A complete description  of the sample and its 
derivation  is presented  in  the Data  Appendix. 
14The base wage rate is typically  the wage  paid to the lowest-skill 
group covered  by the collective  bargaining  agreement.  In some contracts, 
the base rate  refers  to the rate for a more highly  skilled  occupation  group 
(such as assemblers  in  the automobile  industry).  An important  assumption 
for the analysis  in  this paper  is that  variation  over time in intra- 
contract  wage differentials  is small  enough to be safely ignored. 14 
contract  observations  I have  merged  a variety  of  aggregate,  industry- 
specific,  and regional  data. 
Some summary  characteristics  of  the data  set are presented  in  Table  1. 
The sample  spans  a 16 year period  between 1968 and 1983, with a fairly even 
distribution  of contracta  over years after  1970.  The average  duration  of 
the contracts  is 26 months,  although  durations  vary somewhat  by year, with 
relatively  short  contracts  in the mid-1970's.  The fraction  of  contracts 
with escalation  clauses  shows  a steadily increasing  trend  until  the mid- 
1970's and then  varies  erratically,  with  an  overall  average  of 33 percent. 
Some indication  of the trends  in employment and wages  in the sample  is 
15 
provided  by the indexes  in  columns  (4)  and (5) of the table.  Real  wages 
among  expiring  contracts  show  significant growth  until  1977,  then  remain 
relatively  constant.  Average  employment  shows no secular  trend, but 
reflects  cyclical  downturns  in  1971, 1975, and 1983. 
The available  employment  measure  is a crude  one.  Nevertheless, 
contract-to-contract  changes  in  employment are significantly  correlated 
with industry-level  changes  in real  output over the same period  (the simple 
correlation  coefficient  over 1293 observations is .18).  This  correlation 
suggests  that  at least a fraction  of  the rather  large variation  in 
contract-to-contract  employment  changes consists  of signal,  rather  than 
noise. 
The empirical  strategy  in  this paper is to fit employment  equations 
based on equation  (5) to end-of-contract  observations  on employment  and 
15The wage and employment  indexes represent  year-effects  from 
regression  equations  for contract-to-contract  changes  in end-of-contract 
wages and employment.  These  indexes therefore  control  for the composition 
of the set of expiring  contracts  in  each  year. 15 
wages  for each  contract.  Assuming  that  the employment  demand  function  is 
homogeneous  of degree  zero in factor  pricea, the empirical  analyais  is 
invariant  to the choice  of  deflators  for wagea  and intermediate  input 
prices.  As the discussion  in Section Ia suggests,  however,  it is 
particularly  convenient  to work with  wages in  real terms,  deflated  by the 
consumer price index.  In  the remainder of the paper, wages and industry 
prices  are therefore  expressed  in  real terms. 
The real  wage rate at  the end of  each contract  (including  any 
contingent  payments  generated  by a cost-of-living  escalator)  is measured 
directlyJ6  As pointed  out in the previous section,  this rate  will 
generally  differ  from  its expectation  as of  the negotiation  date of the 
contract  by a component  that depends on  the indexation  provisions  of the 
contract  and the deviation  between  actual and expected  prices  at the end of 
the contract.  Let w*(T)  represent  the expected  value  of the logarithm  of 
the real  wage at  the end of  the contract.  In a nonindexed  contract,  the 
logarithm  of  the actual  real  wage rate  at the end of the contract,  w(T),  is 
related  to w*(T)  by 
(6)  w(T)  —  w*(T) 
-  (p(T) 
-  p*(T)), 
where  p(T) represents  the logarithm  of  the consumer  price index at the end 
of the contract,  and p*(T)  represents  the parties'  expectation  of  p(T), 
formed  T months  ago during  negotiations  over  the current  contract. 
In an indexed contract,  unexpected  changes in prices  generate  unexpected 
changes  in real  wage rates  if and only  if  the degree of indexation  is 
incomplete.  For example,  if an escalation clause  increases  nominal  wages 
16The wage data  used in this paper has been carefully  checked  for 
changes  in base rate  definitions  and misreporting  of cost-of-living 
payments.  See the Data  Appendix. 16 
by e percent  for each  one-percent  increase in the consumer  price index, 
then  w(T)  and  w*(T)  are related by 
(7)  w(T)  —  w*(T) 
-  (l-e)(p(T) 
- p*(T)). 
Most escalated  contracts  in North  American  labor  agreements  do not specify 
a fixed  elasticity  of indexation)7  Instead,  they specify a fixed  absolute 
wage increase  per absolute  point  increase in  consumer  prices.  Some 
agreements  also specify  a minimum  price  increase  that must occur  before 
indexation  begins,  and/or  a maximum wage increase  that  can be generated  by 
the escalation  clause.  In such  contracts,  the elasticity  of indexation 
varies  over the term  of the contract, and may be zero for some range  of 
price  increases.  Nevertheless,  equation  (7)  is approximately  correct  for 
an interval  of prices  around  p*(T), where  e is defined  as the marginal 
elasticity  of indexation  evaluated at the expected  level of prices  at the 
end of the contract. 
Given  an estimate  of  the elasticity of indexation,  &,  and  an  estimate 
of the parties'  expected  price  level at the end of the contract,  (T), it 
is possible  to decompose  the actual real wage rate  at the end of a contract 
into an estimate  of its expected  component, 4(T),  and an estimate  of its 
unexpected  component: 
ü(T)  —  w(T) 
-  4(T), 
where 
4(T)  —  w(T) 
-  (1 
-  a)(p(T) 
- 
Using  the definition  of  4(T),  the estimated unexpected  component  of real 
wages  can be written  as: 
175ee  Card (1983)  for a descriptive analysis  of cost-of-living 
escalation  clauses  among  collective bargaining  agreements  in  Canada. 17 
(8)  ft(T)  —  u(T) 
- ( -  e)(p(T) 
-  p*(T))  +  (1 -  a)((T) 
- p*(T)). 
This  estimate  differs  from  the true value u(T) by two terms:  one of whith 
depends  on the differente  between  the actual and measured  elasticity  of 
indexation  (and is therefore  identically  zero in  a non-indexed  contract); 
the other  of which  depends  on the difference between  measured  price 
expectations  and the parties'  true expectations.  Provided  that these  terms 
are orthogonal  to any factors  that  might otherwise  induce  a correlation 
between  employment  and real  wages,  however, the estimated  forecast  error 
11(T) may be used as a legitimate  instrumental variable  for the level  of 
wages  at the end of  the contract. 
In this  paper I  use a naive  forecasting  model  to form  estimates  of the 
expected  price  level  at  the end of the contract, based  on the average  rate 
of inflation  over the 12 months  prior  to the negotiation  date.18  I have 
experimented  with other forecasting  equations,  including  one that  uses 
estimated  coefficients  based on  the 10  most recent  years of data  prior to 
the contract  negotiation,  and found  little difference  between  them. 
Column  6 of Table  1 reports average  forecasting errors  in  the end-of- 
contract  price level.  The average  forecast error  is 1.2 percent,  but 
varies  considerably  by  year,  ranging  from 7.0 percent  for contracts 
expiring  in 1974  and 1975,  to -4.5 percent for contracts  expiring  in  1971. 
The other  ingredient  in the calculation  of unexpected  real wage  changes 
is the elasticity  of indexation  e.  In  the absence of precise  information 
on the actual indexation  formulas  in  the sample, I use the ratio  of total 
18The  forecasting  equation  predicts  the one-year  ahead  inflation  rate 
at the negotiation  date t as  .0144 +  .7858  DP(t-12),  where DP(t-l2)  is the 
actual  percentage  change  in  prices over  the preceding  12  months.  The two 
and three-year  ahead  inflation  rate forecasts generated  by this equation 
are  .021 + .693 DP(t-12),  and  .026 + .6135 DP(t-12),  respectively. 18 
escalated  increases  over the life of the contract  to  the total  increase  in 
consumer  prices  over  the life of the contract  as an  estimate  of  e.  This 
measure is reasonably  accurate  for contracts with no restrictions  on  the 
escalation  formula.  For contracts  that restrict  the escalation  clause  by 
specifying  a minimum  price increase before  the start  of indexation,  or a 
delay  in  the start  of indexation  until the second  or third  year of the 
contract,  or a maximum  allowable  escalated  increase,  this measure 
introduces  some noise  into the calculation of  11(T). 
As the formulas  in  equations  (6) and (7) imply,  forecasting  errors  in 
end-of-contract  real wage  rates  are strongly  negatively  correlated  with 
forecast  errors  in  prices.  The annual averages  of the forecast  errors  in 
real  wages  in column  7 of  Table  1 are close to mirror  images of the 
associated  price  forecasting  errors.  The forecasting  errors in real wages 
are dampened,  however,  by the indexation provisions  of the escalated 
contracts.  The average  estimated  elasticity  of indexation  among  indexed 
contracts  is .50, implying  that the forecast  errors in  real wages  among 
these  contracts  are about  one-half  as large  as the corresponding  forecast 
19  errors in  prices. 
Interestingly,  the average  forecast error  in  end-of-contract  real 
wages  is strongly  negatively  correlated with the employment  index  in column 
(5) (the correlation  coefficient  over 16 annual  observations  is - .54;  the 
implied  regression  coefficient  of employment  on  unanticipated  real  wage 
changes  is -.70, with a standard  error of .27).  This  provides  some 
19The  forecast  error  in  end-of-contract  real wages  is -(l-e)p, where p 
is the forecast  error  in  end-of-contract  prices,  and e is the elasticity  of 
indexation.  The average forecast  error in real wages  is therefore 
-(l-e)p + covarisnce(e,p),  where  e is  the average  elasticity  of indexation 
and p  is the average  forecast  error in  prices. 19 
evidence  that contractual  employment  outcomes are negatively  related  to 
unexpected  changes in real  wages. By comparison, employment  is poaltively 
correlated  with the level  of real  wages as measured  by the index  in column 
(4). 
Contract-specific  correlations  between employment  and wages are 
reported  in Table 2.  The data are measured as first  differences  over 
consecutive  contracts  for the same sample of  negotiations  used in  Table  1. 
Also presented  in  the table are correlations  of contract-specific 
employment  and wage outcomes with two meaaures of outside wages:  the 
average  real  wage rate in the same  (2-digit) industry,  measured  in  the 
expiration  month of  the contract;  and the average  real wage for unskilled 
non-production  laborers  in the same  province,  measured  in the expiration 
year of the contract2° 
The simple  correlations  in Table  2  reveal  several  important  features  of 
the contract-level  data.  First,  changes in employment  are only  weakly 
negatively  correlated  with changes  in  end-of-contract  real  wage rates. 
Second,  the correlations  between  employment  and outside wages are of 
similar magnitude  to the correlations  between employment  and contract 
wages.  Third,  changes  in employment  are more strongly  negatively 
correlated  with changes  in the unexpected  component  of real  wages.  Thus, 
the OLS estimate  of  the elasticity  of  employment  with respect  to contract 
wages  is much smaller  in absolute  value  than  the corresponding  instrumental 
variables  estimate,  formed  using unexpected  changes in real wages as an 
20The  provincial  wage is measured  from  data  collected  annually  by 
Labour  Canada  in  its area  wage survey.  Data  in this survey  is collected  by 
city.  I have used the wage rate  for the  largest  city  in each province  as a 
measure of the province-specific  wage.  See the Data  Appendix. 20 
instrumental  variable.  The OLS estimate is - .19,  with a standard  error  of 
.08, while  the instrumental  variables  estimate  is  -  .70, with a standard 
error  of .18.  As will  be seen  below,  this pattern  continues  to hold  when 
other  covariates  are added  to the employment  determination  equation. 
III. The Effect  of  Previous  Wage  Rates on Subsequent  Wage Determination 
As a preliminary  step in the analysis of employment  determination,  this 
section  presents  a  brief summary of  estimated  wage  determination  equations 
for the ssmple  of collective  bargaining  contracts  introduced  above.  The 
main  purpose  of this analysis  is to identify  the effect  that the level  of 
reel  wages  at the end of  the preceding  contract  exerts  on subsequent  wage 
determination.  A finding of significant  spillover  effects between 
contracts  implies that  unexpected  changes in  real wages  have persistent 
effects  on the costs of contractual  labor.  A finding of insignificant 
spillover  effects,  on the other  hand, implies that these changes  are short- 
lived.  The degree  of persistence  in  unexpected  wage changes,  in turn,  is 
important  for assessing  the magnitude  of the effect  that these  changes will 
exert on employment  determination. 
The analysis  is based  on two alternative measures  of negotiated  wages: 
the real wage  at the start of the contract; and the expected  average  real 
wage over the term  of  the entire  contract.  In  the presence  of adjustment 
costs, the wage  at the start  of  the next  contract  is particularly  relevant 
for employment  setting  behavior  in  the last few months  of an existing 
agreement.  By  comparison,  the expected average  real wage over the next 
contract  gives a longer-term  measure  of  the costs of contractual 
employment. 21 
A  convenient  statistical  framework for analyzing  the determinants  of 
wages  is a simple  components-of-variance  model  of the form: 
(8) 
w.1 
—  +  b  +  A 
w(T)i11 
+ 
where  w..  represents  the measure  of  contractual  wages  (either the real  wage 
at the start of the contract,  or the expected average  real  wage over the 
life  of the contract)  for the 1th contract of the ith firm, e  represents  a 
permanent  firm-specific  component  of wage variation,  Xii 
represents  a 
vector  of determinants  of  wages  (measured at the negotiation  date), 
w(T)i11 
represents  the real wage at  the end of  the previous  contract,  and 
represents  a contract-specific  component of  variance.  The parsmeters  b 
and A can  be estimated  by taking contract-to-contract  first  differences: 
(9)  Awii 
—  - 
w.11 
—  b 
Ax1 
+  A 
Aw(T)i11 
+ 
Conventional  least-squares  estimates  of the first-differenced  wage equation 
may be inappropriate,  however,  if  there is any correlation  between  the real 
wage at the end of  the  (11)5t contract and the error  component 
-  in the first-differenced  wage equation.  This problem  is 
readily  overcome  by using  instrumental variables  for the lagged  change  in 
ending  real wage rates.21  Suitable  instruments  include  the first- 
difference  in the unexpected  component  of ending  real  wages  and any 
exogenous  components  of 
Axiii. 
First-differencing  also introduces  a 
moving  average  error  component  into consecutive employment  changes from the 
same hargaining  pair.  The estimated  standard errors  and test  statistics  in 
the table  therefore  allow  for first-order  residual  correlation  between 
21  .  . 
This problem  is very similar  to one of estimating  the effect  of a 
lagged  dependent  variable in  a panel  data model:  see Holtz-Aitken,  Newey, 
and Rosen (1987). 22 
observations  from  the same pair,  as well as arbitrary  conditional 
heteroskedasticity. 
Estimation  results  for the first-differenced  wage determination 
equation  (9)  are reported  in  Table 3.  The first 4 columns  of the table 
report  estimates  using the real wage at  the start  of  the contract  as the 
measure  of wage outcomes,  while the next  4 columns  report  estimates  using 
the first difference  of  the expected average real  wage rate over  the life 
of  the contract  as the dependent  variable.22  The components  of 
xii 
include 
the regional unemployment  rate  (measured in  the effective  month of  the 
contract),  the real wage  rate in  aggregate manufacturing  (measured  in  the 
effective  month  of the contract),  the province-specific  real  wage rate for 
unskilled  workers (measured  in  the effective year of the contract),  and a 
set of unrestricted  year effects  for the effective  date of the contract. 
The addition  of these year effects results in a significant  improvement  in 
the fit of the wage equations,  although it does not alter  the inferences 
concerning  the effect  of  previous wages.  I have also  estimated  wage 
equations  that include industry-level  output  and price  variables.  These 
variables  are only  weakly  related to negotiated  wages,  however,  and their 
inclusion  leads  to very similar  estimates for the other  variables. 
Columns  (1) and (5) of Table 3 report  OLS estimates  of equation  (9)  for 
the two alternative  dependent  variables,  while  columns  (2)  and (6)  report 
instrumental  variables  (IV) estimates.  These  various  specifications  all 
22The expected  average  real wage in each  month in  the contract  is 
estimated  by formulas  analogous  to equations  (6)  and (7), using estimates 
of the expected  price  level  in  that month  and estimates  of the elasticity 
of indexation  as described  above.  The expected  average  real  wage is an 
unweighted  average  of expected  monthly rates sampled  at 6-month  intervals 
throughout  the contract  period,  starting in  the first month of the contract. 23 
suggest  that  negotiated  wagea  are significantly  poaitively  related  to the 
level of wages  at the end of  the preceding  contract.  The OLS estimates  of 
the coefficient  A  (in row 6.) differ  somewhat  for the two alternative 
measures  of  the dependent  variable,  although  the IV  estimates  are closer 
together.  The last row of the table reports  overidentification  test 
statistics  for the  instrumental variables  estimators.  There  is no evidence 
against  the exclusion  restrictions  implicit  in the IV procedure  for the 
specification  in column  (2).  The test statistic  for the specification  in 
column  (6), on  the other hand,  presents  mild  evidence  against these 
restrictions. 
In  columns  (3)  and (7) the change in prices  over the preceding  contract 
is introduced  directly  into the wage  determination  equation.  This addition 
permits  a test of  the hypothesis  that aggregate  price  increases  effect 
future  wage determination  only to the extent that  they  affect  the level  of 
real  wages at  the end of  the preceding  contract.  The estimated 
coefficients  in row 8. of the table provide no evidence against  this 
hypothesis.  Finally,  the specifications  in  columns  (4) and (8) relax the 
assumption  that the expected  and unexpected  components  of the 
end-of-contract  wage w(T)11 
have the same effect on  subsequent  wages.23 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  there  is no evidence  against  the restricted 
specification:  the t-statistics  for the hypothesis  of  equal  coefficients 
for the expected  and  unexpected  components  are 1.32 in column  (4), and 1.22 
in column (8). 
23These  equations  are estimated  using  the change  in  prices  over the 
previous  contract,  the manufacturing  wage at the effective  date  of the 
previous  contract,  and year effects for the effective  date of  the previous 
contract  as instrumental  variables  for the expected  and unexpected 
components  of real  wages  at the end of the previous  contract. 24 
In summary, these  results suggest  thst  unexpected  changes  in wages  have 
persistent  effects on the costs  of contractual  labor.  An unanticipated 
one-percent  decrease  in real  wages  leads  to spproximately  a one-third 
percent  lower  real wage in the following  contrsct.  Thus,  even in the 
presence  of costly employment  adjustment,  unanticipated  changes  in contract 
wages provide  a  potentially  useful  mechanism  for identifying  the causal 
effects  of real  wages  on employment  determination. 
I)LThe  Determinants  of Contractual  Employment 
This section  turns  to eatimates  of the contractual  employment 
determination  equation  (5).  The framework  for the empirical  analysis  is a 
components-of-variance  model for the logarithm of end-of-contract 
employment  in  the ith contract  of  the th  firm (n): 
(10) 
nij 
—  +  a  + 
w(T)i 
+ 
In this  equation,  represents  a permanent  firm-specific  effect, 
zij 
represents  a vector  of determinants  of  employment,  measured  at the end of 
the contract, 
wij(T) 
represents  the real  wage rate at  the end of the 
contract,  and 
cii 
is a contract-specific  disturbance.  Assuming that 
industry  output  and prices  are used as proxies  for firm-specific  output  and 
price data,  the elasticity  fi  of equation  (10) is related to the underlying 
parameters  of the employment  demand  schedule  (3) and the relative  output 
equation  (4) by  fi 
— &l 
+ 25 
Again,  a convenient  method  for handling  the pair-specific  effects  is to 
take first-differences  across  consecutive  contracts,  yielding 
(11)  —  a zij 
+  fi w(T)1 
+  e. 
In many previous  studies,  employment  outcomes have been found  to follow  a 
partial  adjustment  equation  of the form  — (l - 
n*ij 
÷  '-l 
where 
n*ij represents  the optimal  level of  employment  in the absence  of 
adjustment  costs,  as given  by an equation  such  as (5).  Partial adjustment 
is readily  accommodated  within  the framework  of equation  (11) by the 
addition  of a lagged  dependent  variable.  In  the present  context, however, 
the interval  of observation  on  employment  outcomes  is typically  24-36 
months.  Thus,  the extent  of incomplete  adjustment  is likely  to be much 
smaller  than  that  observed  in quarterly  or annual  data.  This issue  is 
addressed  more thoroughly  below. 
Estimation  results  for the first-differenced  employment  equation  are 
presented  in Tables  6 and  5.  Following  the discussion  in section  Ib, the 
determinants  of employment  include  the 3-digit  industry  input price 
(deflated by the consumer  price index), industry-level  real output, and the 
end-of-contract  real  wage rate.  Measures  of the industry-level  real  wage 
rate  as well as a regional  measure  of  workers'  alternative  wage  rate are 
included  in the regressions  in  Table 5.  In  addition,  a lagged  dependent 
variable is included  several  of the specifications  in  Table  5.  I have not 
made  any attempt  to directly  measure  the user  cost of  capital.  Assuming 
that  capital  costs  are constant  across  manufacturing  industries,  however, 
variation  in  the user cost  of  capital  is absorbed  by the trends and/or  time 
effects  in the empirical  specification. 26 
In  order  to capture  partial adjustment  phenomena,  and also to control 
in part  for the fact that industry output  is measured  annually,  the 
employment  equations  in  Tables  4 and 5 include industry  output in both the 
expiration  year of the agreement  and the previous  year.  I have 
experimented  with specifications  that  also include wage rates  and input 
prices  in the year prior  to the expiration  date,  but the effects  of these 
variables  are always poorly  determined  and small  in  magnitude. 
The first  two columns of Table 4 present OLS estimatea  of the 
employment  equation  with and without year  effects  for the expiration  year 
of the contract.  Employment  is positively  related  to intermediate  input 
prices  and  positively  related  to both current and last  year's  level  of 
output.  The estimate  of the elasticity  of employment  with respect  to 
output (the sum of the coefficients  of  the current  and  previous  years' 
output)  is substantially  less than  unity,  implying  increasing  returns  to 
scale  in  the framework  of equation  (3).  The addition  of year effects 
results  in only  a relatively  small  improvement  in the fit of the employment 
equations:  the probability  value  of an exclusion  test for the year effects 
is reported  in row 8. of the table.  The addition  of  the year  effects, 
however,  substantially  reduces  the estimated  effect  of wages  on  employment. 
Controlling  for year effects,  employment  is virtually  uncorrelated  with 
contract  wages. 
The point  estimates  of the elasticity  of employment  demand  are 
significantly  larger  (in absolute  value) when the end-of-contract  wage rate 
is instrumented  by the unanticipated  change in real  wages over the term  of 
the contract.  The results  of this  exercise  are reported  in  columns  (3) and 
(4)  of  Table  4.  Without year  effects,  the estimated  elasticity  rises  from 27 
- .15  to - .28,  although  the estimated  standard  error  rises  proportionately. 
With year  effects,  the change  in  the point  estimate  is even  more 
remarkable:  from  - .02  to  - .45.  A Hausman  test  of the difference  between 
the OLS and IV  estimates  is not significant at conventional  levels, 
however,  mainly  as a consequence  of  the imprecision  of the IV  estimator 
when  year effects  are included  in the employment  equation.24 
The IV estimators  in columns  (5) and (6) attempt  to address  this 
imprecision  by expanding  the list  of instrumental  variables  for the end-of- 
contract  real  wage rate to include year  effects  for the signing  date  of the 
contract  and the aggregate  real wage  in manufacturing  in the starting  month 
of the contract.  The addition  of  the extra instruments  increases  the 
magnitude  of  the point  estimates  of  the elasticity  of demand  slightly,  and 
results  in some improvement  in the precision  of the estimates.  The 
overidentification  tests  for the consistency  of the instrument  sets are 
well  below  conventional  significance  levels: the probability  values  of 
these  teats  are reported  in row 9. of the table.  Even  with the addition  of 
these  extra  instrumental  variables,  however,  the estimated  elasticity  of 
labor  demand  from the equation  with year  effects is only marginally 
significant.  Nevertheless,  a Hausman  test of  the difference  between  the 
estimated  demand  elasticities  in  columns 1 and  5 is significant  at the 1 
percent  level,  while  a test  of the difference  between  the estimated 
elasticities  in columns  2 and 6  is significant  at  the 10 percent  level. 
simple Hausman  test  procedure  cannot be applied  to the estimates 
in  Table 4 because  the OLS estimates  are not fully  efficient  under the null 
hypothesis  of no simultaneity  bias,  given the serial correlation  and 
heteroskedasticity  of  the residuals. 28 
These findings  suggest  that the OLS estimates  of the elasticity  of 
employment  demand  are significantly  positively  biased. 
The final columns of Table  4 present  estimated  employment  equations  that 
include  the change  in  aggregate  consumer prices  over  the term  of the 
contract  as an additional  explanatory  variable.  These  equations  are 
included  as a check  that the IV estimates  are not biased  by a direct 
correlation  between  inflation  rates and employment  growth  rates. 
Controlling  for end-of-contract  real wage rates,  there ia no evidence  of 
such  a correlation.  The contract  data are therefore  consistent  with a 
simple  structural  model in  which  aggregate  price changes  lead  to real wage 
changes  that  lead to employment  changes. 
The effects  of  outside wage rates  on  contractual  employment 
determination  are addressed  in  Table  5.  The analysis  in section  I 
identified  two alternative  routes  for this effect.  First,  average wages in 
the industry  are expected  to have  a  nositive  effect  on employment,  as a 
consequence  of the fact  that  output  is measured  at the industry  rather  than 
the firm  level.  Second, wages  representing  the alternative  wage available 
to employees  are expected  to have a negative  effect  on  employment,  if 
employment  is influenced  by efficient  contracting  considerations.  In an 
effort  to distinguish  between  these hypotheses,  I have included  the 
industry  wage in  columns  (1)  and (3) of the table,  and a province-specific 
wage for  unskilled  laborers  in  columns  (2)  and (4) of the table.  Both wage 
measures  are included  in column  (5). 
The OLS estimates  in  columns  (1) and (2)  show  no evidence  of a role for 
either  outside  wage  measure.  When the contract  wage is instrumented, 
however,  the point  estimate  of the effect  of  industry-specific  wages riaea 29 
substantially  while  the estimated  effect  of the regional  wage  measure 
remains  close  to  zero.  A similar  pattern  emerges  in column (5) when both 
outside  wage  measures  are included.  Given  the imprecision  of the estimated 
elasticities,  it is  difficult  to draw strong conclusions  from these 
results.  However,  the point estimates  lend  much  stronger  support  to the 
view that outside wages  belong  in  the employment  equation  as a proxy  for 
the level  of  competitor's  relative  costs  than  to the view that outside 
wages  belong  in  the employment  equation  as a proxy  for the shadow  value of 
employees'  time.  If the former view is taken  literally,  the point 
estimates  in column  (3)  suggest  that the output-constant  elasticity  of 
employment  demand  with respect  to  wages  is  - .33,  while the elasticity  of 
output supply  with  respect  to an  increase  in  wages is  - .70.25  The implied 
estimate  of the output-constant  demand  elasticity  is consistent  with the 
- .2  to  - .4  range of estimates  generally  obtained  in  the literature  on 
static employment  demand  (see Hamermesh  (1986, pp. 451-454). 
The question  of whether  these estimated  employment  equations  are robust 
to the inclusion  of lagged  employment  is explored  in  the last two columns 
of Table 5.  Since the employment  equations  are estimated  in first 
differences,  and the correlation  of  consecutive  first  differences  of the 
change  in employment  is biased  downward  by any measurement  error in 
employment,  the lagged  value  of industry output  is added to the list of 
instrumental  variables  and lagged  employment  and real wages  at the end of 
25Recall  from  equation  (5)  that the elasticity  of employment  with 
respect  to wages is  + a1), 
while the elasticity  of employment  with 
respect  to industry  average wages  is a1 
.  An  estimate  of a from  column  (3) 
of Table 5 is .39 (the sum of the coefftcienta  of current  and last year's 
output).  Using  the other  estimated  coefficients  from  this equation  leads 
to the conclusions  in  the text. 30 
the contract  are treated as jointly  endogenous.  The results  show  no 
evidence  of a direct  role for lagged  employment,  once industry  output, 
input  prices,  and contract  wages  are included  in  the employment  equation. 
As mentioned  earlier,  this is perhaps  unsurprising,  since  the time lag 
between  consecutive  observations  in  this contract-based  data  set is on  the 
order  of 2-3 years.  Over  such  an interval,  the effects  of  partial 
adjustment  are likely  to be smaller  than  over  an interval  of a quarter  or 
26 
year. 
The empirical  results  in Tables  4 and 5 lead  to  two main  conclusions. 
First,  there  is consistent  evidence  that contractual  employment  outcomes 
are negatively  related  to  contractual  wage rates.  Although  the raw 
correlation  between  end-of-contract  employment  and  wages is small  and 
statistically  insignificant,  this is apparently  a consequence  of 
simultaneity  bias.  When unanticipated  real  wage changes  and/or  other 
exogenous  variables  are used as instrumental variables  for the end-of- 
contract  wage,  the estimated  employment  elasticities  are consistently 
negative and stable in  magnitude  across  alternative  specifications. 
Second,  there is no evidence  that  contractual  employment  is related  to 
outside  wage rates  in a  manner  consistent  with simple  models  of efficient 
contracting.  While  employment  is uncorrelated  with region-specific  wage 
measures,  however,  it is weakly  positively  correlated  with industry  average 
wages.  This positive  correlation  is consistent  with the hypothesis  that 
261n  principle,  the coefficient  of the lagged  dependent  variable  will 
differ,  depending  on  the duration  of  the previous  contract.  In view of  the 
imprecision  of the estimated  effects in columns  (7) and (8)  of Table 5, 
however,  I have  not attempted  to address this issue. 31 
higher  average  industry wages  lead  to improvements  in the firm's 
competitive  position  and increases  in employment.27 
Conclusions 
This paper  studies  the nature  of employment  determination  in  long-term 
union contracts.  A key aspect  of these contracts,  much  emphasized  in  the 
macroeconomics  literature,  is the fact that nominal wages  are partly  or 
wholly  pre-determined.  Real wage rates at the end of a contract  therefore 
contain  unanticipated  components  that  reflect  unexpected  changes  in 
consumer  prices  over the life of  the contract  and the degree  of indexation 
in the contract.  These unanticipated  real  wage  changes  provide  a 
convenient  tool for separating  the causal  effect  of  wages  on employment 
determination  from  other ertdogenous sources of employment  and wage 
variation. 
The empirical  analysis  is based  on a large panel  of collective 
bargaining  agreements  from  Canadian  manufacturing.  In this sample, 
contract-to-contract  changes  in  employment  are only  weakly  related  to 
corresponding  changes  in  contractual  wages.  When  unexpected  changes  in 
real wages  are used  as an instnimental variable  for wages, however, 
employment  is consistently  negatively  related  to contract wages.  This 
finding  suggests  that the characteristically  weak correlations  between 
employment  and wages  reported  in many previous  studies may be due in part 
to the endogenous  determination  of  wages  in  the labor market.  Once this 
endogeneity  is taken  into account,  the results from this study  suggest  that 
27The  finding  that  firm-level  employment  is positively  related  to 
industry  average wages is also  reported  by Nickell  and Wadhwani (1987). 32 
employment  and  wages  at the firm level are significantly  negatively 
related. 
Two other  findings  emerge  from  the empirical  analysis.  First, 
unanticipated  changes  in prices  generate  changes  in real  wages  not only 
during  the term  of existing  contracts,  but also in subsequent  agreements. 
Second,  there  is no evidence  that  contractual  employment  determination  is 
related  to outside wage rates  in a manner  consistent  with simple models  of 
efficient  contracting.  Rather,  the empirical  results  suggest  that 
employment  outcomes  in  union  contracts  are determined  on a conventional 
downward-sloping  demand  schedule,  taking  the prevailing  contract  wage as 
given.  These  findings  underscore  the importance  of the institutional 
structure  of wage determination  for the cyclical properties  and persistence 
of employment  changes. Data  AnDendix 
1.  Contract  Samole 
The contract  sample is derived  from  the December  1985 version  of Labour 
Canada's  Wage Tape.  This Tape contains  information  on collective 
bargaining  agreements  covering  more than 500 employees  in  Canada.  Starting 
from the 2868 manufacturing  contracts  on  the tape,  I merged  together 
contract  chronologies  between  the same  firm  and union  covering  different 
establishments,  and eliminated  contracts  from  bargaining  pairs  with fewer 
than  four contracts.  These  procedures  yield a sample of 2258  contracts 
negotiated  by 299 firm  and union  pairs.  Further  information  on the merging 
process  and the characteristics  of the resulting  sample  are presented  in 
the Data  Appendix  to Card (1988) and in  Tables 1 and 2 of that paper. 
The employment  data  for this sample were then  checked  in  two stages. 
First,  the number  of  workers  covered  in each  contract  was compared  to the 
number covered  in  the preceding  and subsequent  agreements.  Second,  in 
cases  where  the number  of  workers  changed  dramatically  between  contracts, 
the contract  summaries  in Labour  Canada's Collective  Bargaining  Review 
(Ottawa: Labour  Canada  Collective  Bargaining  Division)  were  consulted.  In 
238 contracts,  the employment  counts recorded  on the Wage  Tape  were found 
to be in disagreement  with the counts  reported  in  the Collective  Bargaining 
Review.  In these  cases,  counts from the published  contract  summaries  were 
used.  In caaes  for which the set of  establishments  covered  by the contract 
changed  over time,  contracts  with inconsistent  coverage  were  deleted from 
the sample.  Of the 2258 contracts  in  the subsample  of merged  contracts, 
valid coverage  data  are available  for 1813 contracts  (80.3 percent). 
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Checking  of the  employment data was  performed by Thomas  Lemieux.  I  am 
extremely  greteful to him for providing  me with these data. 
In this  paper, employment  at the end  of a contract  is measured  by the 
number  of  workers  covered  by the subsequent  agreement.  Furthermore,  the 
estimation  procedures  require  information  on employment  and  wage outcomes 
in the previous  agreement,  and on various  industry  and aggregate  data  which 
are only  available  between  1966 and 1983.  The sample  of  contracts  used in 
this  paper therefore  consists  of the subset  of contracts  in the initial 
2258 contract  merged  subsample  that  satisfy  the following  criteria: 
-(a)  information  on at least one previous  contracts  is available  in the 
sample. 
(b)  -information on at  least  one subsequent  contract  is available  in the 
sample. 
(c) the expiration  dates of the current and previous  contract  are after 
January  1966 and  before  December  1983. 
(d) valid  employment  data are available  for both the current  and 
preceding  contract  (i.e. valid  counts  of workers  covered  are 
available  for  both the current  and subsequent  contracts). 
2  Aesregate  and Industry-level  Data 
The following  aggregate  and industry-level  data  were merged  to the 
contract  sample. 
(a) Consumer  price  index, all items, 1981—100.  January  1961 to 
November  1985: Cansim  D484000,  from  the 1985 Cansim  University  Base 
Tape.  December  1985 to June 1986:  from  the Bank  of Canada  Review, 
November  1986. 35 
(b) Average hourly earnings in manufacturing.  January 1961 to March 
1983:  Cansim D1518, from the 1983 Cansim University Base Tape. 
April 1983 to June 1986:  Cansim L5607, from the Bank of Canada 
Review, various issues.  Data from April  1983 and later are 
multiplied by 1.04035 to correct for the revision in the estab- 
lishment survey. 
(c) Average hourly earnings of nonproduction production  laborers, by 
province.  Annual data on hourly earnings for selected occupations 
are available for major cities.  I matched data for the following 
cities to their respective provinces: Halifax,  St.  John, Montreal, 
Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, Edmonton, Vancouver.  The wage rates 
used are listed as rates for "male general laborers" between 1966 
and 1977, for "general laborers in service occupations" between 
1978 and 1981, and for "nonproduction laborers" between  1982 and 
1985.  Data for 1966-72 are from Wage Rates. Salaries, and Hours of 
Labour (Ottawa: Canada Department of Labour), 1966-1972 editions. 
Data for 1973-1986 are from Canada Year Book (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada), various editions.  For contracts that cover two or more 
provinces  I used a weighted  average of Montreal, Toronto,  and 
Vancouver  rates with weights of  .35,  .55,  and  .10,  respectively. 
(d) Unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted.  For contracts in Quebec, 
Ontario, and British Columbia I used the province-specific 
unemployment rates for all workers.  For contracts in other 
provinces I used the national average unemployment  rate.  The 
series used  were: Quebec 
-  Cansim D768478;  Ontario  -  Cansim 
D768648; British Columbia  -  Cansim D769233; all others  -  Cansim 36 
D767611.  Data for January 1966-November 1983 were obtained from 
the 1983 Cansim University Base.  Data  for December  1983-December 
1985 were taken from the Bank of Canada Review November  1986. 
(e)  Industry selling prices, input prices, and output.  Three-digit 
industry level annual data for 1961-71 were taken from Statistics 
Canada's Real Domestic Product By Industry 1961-71 (Ottawa, 
Statistics Canada).  These data are classified by 1960 standard 
industrial codes  (SIC's).  Data on a 1971 SIC basis  for 1971-83 
were taken from the 1978 and 1984 issues of Gross Domestic  Product 
By Industry  (Ottawa: Statistics Canada).  The 1960 and 1971 SIC 
codes were  then matched, and the price and output indexes spliced 
using the 1971 observations from the two sources.  Of 65 3-digit 
industries represented in the contract sample, there were a total 
of 31 for which  3-digit level data was not available  on a 
consistent basis.  For these industries, 2-digit level data was 
used.  The publications report the value of gross output and 
implicit price indexes for gross output and intermediate inputs. 
These data were used  to construct the value of real gross output 
(the measure of "output" used in this paper).  Implicit price 
indexes for gross output and intermediate inputs were deflated 
by the annual average consumer price index to obtain real 
selling prices and input prices used in the paper. 
(f)  Industry average hourly earnings.  Monthly  two-digit industry-level 
average hourly  earnings data for the period January 1961 to March 
1983 were taken from the 1983 Cansim University Base.  Earnings 
data are unavailable  for two industries: knitting  mills, and 37 
miscellaneous  manufacturing.  For the former I used  earnings  in 
clothing industries.  For the latter, I used average earnings  in 
all manufacturing.  Wage rates for April-December  1983 were 
constructed by  index-linking wage rates from the new establishment 
survey to the rates in the  old survey using their values in March 
1983.  Earnings data from the new survey for March-December  1983 
were  taken from Statistics Canada Emoloyment. Earnings, and Hours. References 
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rhrartsriqt1rq  of Ernirine  Contracts  by  Year:  1968—1983 
Year 
Nu.ber 
of  Average 
Contracts  Duration 










Average  Forecast  Error 
Prices  Real Wages 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1968  5  11.2  0.0  87.6  104.4  —.1  .1 
1969  23  21.9  0.0  89.5  101.8  —.8  .9 
1970  87  26.9  12.6  94.1  108.0  —2.0  1.8 
1971  68  29.0  17.6  100.0  100.0  —4.6  3.8 
1972  76  26.3  14.4  104.6  103.6  —3.0  2.8 
1973  90  28.9  11.1  104.8  103.3  1.1  —1.1 
1974  82  29.4  28.0  104.5  110.4  7.1  —6.1 
1975  92  26,9  32.6  106.2  105.9  7.0  —6.3 
1976  104  25.6  52.9  115.2  108.1  1.9  —1.2 
1977  113  23.7  50.4  118.9  105.7  —2.2  1.8 
1978  134  22.1  27.6  118.5  105.6  .1  —.3 
1979  81  22.7  34.5  118.2  112.8  1.1  —.9 
1980  114  24.8  37.7  117.8  112.1  1.9  —1.2 
1981  64  25.9  40.6  115.9  109.9  4.5  -3.3 
















Notes:  Sample  consists  of 1293 contracts  in sanufacturing  sector with usable 
employuent  data  for current and previous  contract  and expiration  dates 
between 1966  and 1983 for the corrent  and previous  contract. 
'Estisated wage index for level  of real wages  at the  end of  expiring 
contracts. 
'Estimated employment  index  for level of employment  at the end of 
expiring  contracts. 
&"Average  percentage  difference  between  price  level  (real wage) at end  of 
contract  and  expected  price  level  (real wage) as forecast  at the 
signing  date of contract.  See text. Table  2 
Means and  Correlations  of E.ployment  and  Wage  Measures 









Contract  Wage 
(End of Contract) 
1.  Employ.ent 
(End of Contract) 
-.017  .201  1.00  —.07 
2. Rea1 Contract  Wage 
(End of Contract) 
.052  075  - .07  1  00 
3.  Industry  Wage 
(Expiration  Month) 
.045  .056  -.04  .59 
4.  Provincial  Wage 
(Expiration  Year) 
.044  .060  —.07  .51 
5.  Unanticipated  Real Wage 
Change  Over contractP/ 
—.004  .077  —.12  .45 
6. 
-  Change  in Consu.er  Price 
Index  Over Contract 
.020  .077  .09  - .22 
Notes:  /Sa.ple is described  in  Table  1.  Sa.ple  size is 1293.  All variables  are 
measured  as first—differences  over consecutive  contracts. 
Percentage  difference  between real wage at end of contract  and  expected  real 
wage forecast  at signing of Contract. Table 3 
Estimated  Wage  Determination  Equations  (First—Differences) 
(standard  errors  in parentheses) 
at 
Real 
Start  of 
Wage 
contract 
Expected  Average 
Real Wage During Contract 
01.5  xv"  DLS  ivW 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1.  Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yea  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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.40  -3D 













.04  .01 





5. Real Wage at  End  of 







-——  .25  .41 




6.  Expected  Real  Wage  at 
End of Previous  Contract 
-——  .46 
(.08) 
--—  .36 
(.09) 
7. Unexpected  Real Wage at 
End of Previous  contract 
———  .41 
(.06) 
-——  .43 
(.07) 
8.  Change in Prices During 
Previous Contract  (.03)  (.03) 
9.  Standard Error  .039  .039  .039  .038  .038  .039  .038  .038 
10. OveridentificationW 
Test  (p—value) 
———  .261  .273  .489  ———  .037  .016  .006 
Notes  In Table  1.  Sample  size  is  1293.  All  Sample  is described  regressions 
include a (first—differenced)  linear  trend.  The mean  and standard  deviation 
of the  dependent  variable  in columns  (1)—(4) are  .050 and  .066.  The sean 
and standard  deviation  of the dependent  variable  in  columns  (5(—(8) are .043 
and  .061.  Standard  errors  are corrected  for first—order  moving  average  error 
component  and  heteroakedasticity. 
Win columns  (2).  (3), (6) and (7), instrumental  variables  for real waEe at the 
end of the previous  contract  include  18 year effects,  the real wage in manufac- 
turing  at the start  of the previous  contract, and the  unanticipated change  in 
real wages  over the previous  contract.  In  columns  (4) and  (8) instrumental 
variables  for expected  real wage at the end of the previous  contract  include  18 
year effects,  the real wage  In manufacturing  at the start of the previous 
contract,  and the change  in prices  during  the previous  contract. 
Test  for orthogonality  of residuals  and instruments.  The statistic  is 
distributed  aa chi-squared  with 19 degrees  of freedom  in columns  (2).  (3),  (6) 
and  (7),  and  with 18 degrees  of freedom in columns  (4) and  (8). Table  4 
Estimated  Employment  Determination  Equations  (First-Differeçj. 
(standard errors  in parentheses) 
(1) 
OLS 




(5)  )6)  (7)  (8) 
1.  Year  Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 






































































6. Change in Prices 





7.  Standard  Error  .196  .194  .196  .195  .196  .196  .196  .197 
8. Test  for Exclusion  of 
Year Effects  (p—value) 
---  .003  -—-  .006  ———  .004  ———  .004 
10. Overldentification 
Test  (p—value) 
.76  .97  .73  .96 
Notes:  Sample  is described  in Table  1.  Sample  size  is 1293.  All  regressions  include 
a (first differenced) linear treod.  The mean  and standard  deviation  of the 
dependent  variable are —.017  and  .201.  Standard errors are corrected for 
first—order moving average error component and  heteroskedasticity. 
!/'Inmtrentai variable for real  wage  at end of contract is the unanticipated 
change  in real wages during  the contract. 
Wlnstrumental  variables for real wage at end of the contract include  18  year 
effects,  the real wage  in manufacturing at the start of the contract,  and the 
unanticipated  change  in real  wages  during the contract. 
'Test for orthogonality  of residuals and  instruments.  The statistic  is 
distributed  as chi—squared with  19  degrees of  freedom  in all cases. Table 5 
Estimated  Employment  Determination  Equations  (First Differences) 
(standard  errors  in parentheses) 
OLS 




(7(  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1.  Year Effects  Yea  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
2.  Real  Industry  Input  .16 



























4. Real Industry  Output  .10 













5. Real WageatEndof  -.03 













6.  Real Wage In Industry  .06 
(.22) 
———  .23 
(.26) 






7.  Real  Wage in Region 
———  —.03 
(.15) 




———  -—— 
8.  Lagged Dependent Variable  ——— 
(insturmented( 




9.  Standard Error  .194  .194  .196  .196  .196  .193  .194 
10.  0veridentification  — 
Test  (p—value) 
———  .972  .967  .972  .451  .666 
Notes:  See notes to  Table  4. 
Instrumental  variables  for the real wage at the end  of the  contract  include  18 
year  effects,  the real wage in manufacturing  at the start  of the contract,  and 
the unanticipated  change  in real wages during  the contract. 
'Estissted on subsample  of 1101 observations.  Mean and  standard  deviation  of 
the  dependent  variable  are  -.015 and .0200, respectively.  Instruments 
include  the instruaent  set above  plus the  lagged value  of industry  output. 
Test  for  orthogonality  of residuals  and instruments.  The statistic  is distri- 
buted  as chi—squared  with 19 degrees of freedom  in  columns  )3)—)5),  and 16 
degrees  of freedom  in columns  (6)—(7), 